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Abstract
Federalism is ostensiblymisplaced tomitigate climate change as a global public concern as it is
prone to import the inadequate incentive structures existing at the international level into the
domestic domain. Drawing from the legal structures and procedures of Swiss federalism, this
article attempts to provide a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between laws
designed to mitigate climate change and federalism. It seeks to demonstrate that federalism
may support effective policies to mitigate climate change, provided that the architecture of
domestic climate change lawmeets certain criteria. These include considerable federal powers,
a degree of institutional flexibility, robust formal channels of influence for subnational actors
on policy formulation at the federal level, ample room for regulatory experimentalism at the
lower layers of federalism, and the ‘right to act’ conferred on the Federation to avoid political
impasse among the constituent units.
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1.      :
  ?
‘Nature’, no less, ‘made your country federal’, concededNapoléon Bonaparte in a letter
to Swiss deputies on 10 December 1802.1 The irony of this observation by the First
† This contribution is part of a collection of articles growing out of the workshop ‘The Law of Energy
Transition in Federal Systems’, held by the University of Tübingen, Faculty of Law, and the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Law, in Tübingen (Germany), 27 June 2019.
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1 Letter from Consul Bonaparte to the Swiss Deputies (Saint-Cloud (France), 10 Dec. 1802), reprinted in
J. Strickler & A. Rufer (eds), Actensammlung aus der Zeit der Helvetischen Republik IX (1798–1803)
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Consul of the First French Republic –who soon thereafter crowned himself ‘Emperor of
the French’ and reshaped the political landscape of the European Continent – was
hardly lost on his contemporaries. After all, it was invading French troops that ignited
and supported the ‘Helvetic Revolution’.2This uprising of 1798 swept away theAncien
Régime – the ‘Old Swiss Confederacy’ of ‘quasi-sovereign petty states’, associates, and
joint dependencies3 – and put in its place a unitary state under French hegemony: the
Helvetic Republic.4 Centralism proved to be a short-lived interlude on Swiss territory,
however. The Act of Mediation of 19 February 1803, imposed by Napoléon in the
wake of his letter, paved the way for Switzerland to be transformed into a federal
state of constituent units with equal powers in 1848.5 Switzerland has since evolved
into one of only ‘three classic federations’6 worldwide, a ‘paradigmatic case’7 of feder-
alism and ‘a role model of a federal polity in Europe’.8 The country’s 2,199 territorial
and political authorities – the federal government (Federation), the 26 constituent units
(cantons9), and the 2,172 municipalities10 – assembled on an area of less than 42,000
square kilometres inhabited by 8.7 million people11 bear witness to Switzerland’s
‘extreme decentralization’.12
These intertwining legal structures provide a unique setting to gain a deeper under-
standing of the relationship between federalism and laws that mitigate climate change.
For reasons of climate physics, this relationship is ostensibly antagonistic. Carbon diox-
ide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases are defined as greenhouse
gases (GHGs) because of their capacity to partially absorb thermal radiation from
(Stämpfli, 1903), pp. 876–8, at 876 (‘La nature a fait votre Etat fédératif’), available at: https://www.amts-
druckschriften.bar.admin.ch/start.do.
2 See A. Holenstein, ‘Beschleunigung und Stillstand: Spätes Ancien Régime und Helvetik (1712-1802/03)’,
in G. Kreis (ed.), Die Geschichte der Schweiz (Schwabe, 2014), pp. 310–61, at 353–4.
3 Th. Maissen, ‘The Swiss Confederacy: A Constitutional Model and Anti-Model for the Founding
Fathers’, in S. Krause (ed.), Theories of Modern Federalism (Nomos, 2019), pp. 49–69, at 49–50.
4 See A. Fankhauser, ‘République helvétique’ (27 Jan. 2011), inDictionnaire historique de la Suisse, avail-
able at: https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/009797/2011-01-27; Th. Maissen, Geschichte der Schweiz,
6th edn (Hier & Jetzt, 2019), pp. 160–2.
5 See Maissen, n. 4 above, pp. 170–2.
6 D.J. Elazar, Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy
Arrangements, 2nd edn (Longman, 1994), p. 246.
7 Th.O. Hueglin & A. Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry, 2nd edn (University of
Toronto Press, 2015), p. 121.
8 M.Burgess,Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2006), p. 117 (according towhom
Switzerland is ‘widely considered to be the role model of a federal polity in Europe’).
9 ‘Canton’ (plural ‘cantons’) is derived from the Latin ‘canton’ (angle, landscape, place) and has prevailed
as the main designation for Switzerland’s constituent units since the Helvetic Revolution: A. Kley,
‘Cantons’ (13 Apr. 2006), in Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse, available at: https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/
articles/026414/2016-04-13.
10 Federal Statistical Office, ‘Les 2172 communes de la Suisse au 1.1.2021’ (2021), available at:
https://www.atlas.bfs.admin.ch/maps/13/fr/15739_229_228_227/24617.html.
11 Federal Statistical Office, ‘Population résidante permanente selon la catégorie de nationalité, l’âge et le
canton, 3e trimestre 2020’ (2020), available at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/popu-
lation/effectif-evolution/population.assetdetail.14941423.html.
12 L. Thorlakson, ‘Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and Representation in Six Federations’ (2003)
26(2) West European Politics, pp. 1–22, at 18.
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the earth’s surface.13 CO2 accounts for around three quarters of all GHG emissions.
14
Multiple lines of evidence indicate a causal and ‘almost linear relationship between
cumulative CO2 emissions and projected global temperature change’.
15Climate change
induced by increased concentration of CO2 ‘remains largely irreversible for 1,000 years
after emissions stop’.16 Each tonne of CO2 emitted into the atmosphere anywhere on
earth at any given time had, has and will have an almost identical effect on the average
global temperature. Climate change therefore constitutes a global public good.17 For an
individual country there is thus little incentive to reduce its GHG emissions unilaterally.
Federalism appears to duplicate these inadequate incentive structures at the domestic
level, further hampering policy measures to mitigate climate change effectively.
Drawing from the legal structures and procedures of Swiss federalism, this article
attempts to provide a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between federalism
and the laws and regulations designed to mitigate climate change. It seeks to demon-
strate that federalismmay support effective policies to mitigate climate change provided
that the relevant framework of constitutional, administrative, and environmental law
meets certain criteria. These include a degree of institutional flexibility, constitutional
provisions to avoid stalemate among the entities of the federation, robust federal
powers, and autonomy at the subnational level allowing for regulatory experimental-
ism and innovation. The article reaches its conclusion in five steps. It briefly clarifies
the relevant taxonomy and carves out the constitutional foundations of Swiss federal-
ism (Section 2) in order to trace the formative influence of federalism on the architecture
of Switzerland’s domestic climate change law (Section 3). The heuristics gained based
on economic approaches to federalism (Section 4) help to analyze the procedures of
domestic climate change law. These rest on relatively broad federal powers and are
13 See Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC, n. 65 below), Kyoto (Japan), 10 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at:
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf (ratified by Switzerland on 9 July 2003, No. 0.814.011,
available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/20021138/index.html; authentic French
version), including the ‘Doha Amendment’, Doha (Qatar), 8 Dec. 2012, in force 31 Dec. 2020, available
at: https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kp_doha_amendment_english.pdf (ratified by
Switzerland on 28 Aug. 2015, available at: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/oc/2020/926/fr).
Correspondingly, Ordinance on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions (Federal CO2 Ordinance), 30 Nov. 2012,
No. 641.711, Art. 1(1); official titles: Verordnung über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen (German),
Ordonnance sur la réduction des émissions de CO2 (French), Ordinanza sulla riduzione delle emissioni
di CO2 (Italian), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20120090/index.html
(non-official English translation).
14
‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Core Writing
Team, R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer (eds)), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report: Contribution of
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCCC (IPCC, 2015), pp. 2–31,
at 5 (regarding 1970–2010), available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_
FINAL_full_wcover.pdf.
15 Ibid., p. 8.
16 S. Solomon et al., ‘Irreversible Climate Change due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions’ (2009) 106(6)
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, pp. 1704–9, at
1704, available at: https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/106/6/1704.full.pdf.
17 See also W.D. Nordhaus, ‘Climate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics’ (2019) 109(6)
American Economic Review, pp. 1991–2014, at 1993; R.N. Stavins, ‘The Problem of the Commons:
Still Unsettled after 100 Years’ (2011) 101(1) American Economic Review, pp. 81–108, at 83, 98.
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embedded in an intertwined network of horizontal cooperation (Section 5), which
allows for regulatory experimentalism at the levels of both the cantons and urbanmuni-
cipalities (Section 6). Methodologically, the article is founded on an analytical examin-
ation of the incentives which the framework of constitutional, administrative, and
environmental law provides to the Federation, the cantons, and the municipalities.18
2.     
2.1. Comparing Federalism: Taxonomy
‘Federalism’ has taken on different meanings on both sides of the Atlantic since the 18th
century.19 While the Swiss Federalists opposed a robust, centralized political authority
during the Helvetic Republic, American Federalists favoured strong central govern-
ance.20 This ambiguity traces back to the Latin word foedus (league) from which the
terms ‘federal’, ‘federation’, and ‘federalism’ are derived.21 These etymological roots
allow groups to refer to the same concept (federalism) while emphasizing different
aspects of its semantic content in order to pursue opposing political ends – favouring
unity over centrifugal tendencies (American Federalists) or stressing the constituent
unit’s autonomy (Swiss Federalists). Such conceptual ambiguities call for scholarship
in comparative law to rest on precise taxonomy. ‘Federation’, ‘federalism’, and ‘federal’
all refer to structures of political governance combining shared rule with self-rule.22
Political entities ranging from federal states to confederacies and supranational organi-
zations thus all form ‘federal polities’ (or ‘federal systems’).23 As a more specific sub-
category, a ‘federation’ (or ‘federal state’) is a territorial and political entity based on
a constitution that allocates political power between a general entity (federal or central
government: ‘the Federation’) and a number of regional entities (constituent units such
as provinces, cantons or states), with each of these entities fulfilling tasks relating to
matters on which they are entitled to take binding and final decisions (‘non-
centralization’).24 The constituent units and the federal government thus ‘exercise
concurrent authority over the people’.25 As a result of the dual composition of
18 For broadly similar approaches in legal regulatory theory see, e.g., R. Baldwin, M. Cave & M. Lodge,
Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2012),
pp. 25–69 (on theories of regulation and on ‘good regulation’), or A.I. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form
and Economic Theory (Hart, 2004), pp. 3–6, 29–54 (on theories and public interests for regulation).
19 Maissen, n. 3 above, p. 49.
20 A. Fankhauser, ‘Fédéralistes’ (28 Jan. 2005), in Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse, available at:
https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/017368/2005-01-28; Maissen, n. 4 above, pp. 165–6; A.R. Amar,
America’s Constitution: A Biography (Random House, 2006), pp. 35–7, 43–53.
21 Maissen, n. 3 above, p. 49.
22 D.J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press, 1987), pp. 34–8.
23 See R.L. Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations’ (1998) 1(1) Annual Review of
Political Science, pp. 117–37, at 121; W.H. Riker, Federalism, 4th edn (Little Brown, 1964), p. 101;
R.P. Inman & D.L. Rubinfeld, Democratic Federalism (Princeton University Press, 2020), pp. 8, 21,
301–5; Burgess, n. 8 above, pp. 226–47 (on the European Union).
24 See, e.g., Elazar, n. 22 above, p. 34; Inman&Rubinfeld, n. 23 above, pp. 8–11; Riker, n. 23 above, p. 11;
Watts, n. 23 above, p. 121.
25 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997).
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federations,26 it is both the Swiss People and the 26 individual cantons that constitute
Switzerland, according to the first provision of the Swiss Federal Constitution.27
Finally, ‘federalism’ refers to both the normative theory and the institutional practice of
legitimizing and advocating a political and legal order committed to non-centralization.28
In some federal states (such as Brazil, Canada, and the United States (US)), both the
federation and the constituent units have their own civil service and judiciary to
implement and adjudicate on their own laws. Such arrangements are referred to as
‘horizontal’ or ‘dualist’ federalism. Political structures such as Germany or
Switzerland, in principle relying on the constituent units to implement federal and
subnational laws alike, are labelled ‘integrated’, ‘executive’, or ‘administrative’
federalism.29 In this article, such systems are defined as ‘administrative interlocking’.30
The term highlights both the vertical (Federation/constituent units) and horizontal
(among constituent units) intertwinement31within the federal polity. The term ‘horizontal
cooperative federalism’ refers to institutionalized cooperation among constituent units.32
2.2. Swiss Federalism: A Constitutional Compromise and an Enduring Legacy
The constitutional framework of Swiss federalism, forming the background of the coun-
try’s domestic climate change law, can be traced back to the first Federal Constitution.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Constitution on 12 September 1848, escalating ten-
sions between liberal-Protestant and conservative-Catholic cantons had erupted into the
brief civil war of 1847–48 (the Sonderbund War), in which an alliance of conservative
cantons – the Sonderbund33 – suffered a resounding defeat.34 This outcome paved the
way to converting the Swiss Confederacy into a federal state.35 Federalism was
26 See J. Madison, ‘The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles’, Federalist Papers, No. 39, 16 Jan.
1788 (stating that both the constituent states and ‘the individual citizens’ compose the nation), available
at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed39.asp.
27 Swiss Federal Constitution, 18 Apr. 1999, No. 101, Art. 1; official titles: Bundesverfassung
der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (German), Constitution fédérale de la Confédération
suisse (French), Costituzione federale della Confederazione Svizzera (Italian), available at:
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html (non-official English translation).
28 But see, e.g., W.S. Livingston, ‘A Note on the Nature of Federalism’ (1952) 67(1) Political Science
Quarterly, pp. 81–95, at 85 (federalism being a function of societies).
29 See Hueglin & Fenna, n. 7 above, pp. 54–5; J. Poirier & Ch. Saunders, ‘Comparing Intergovernmental
Relations in Federal Systems: An Introduction’, in J. Poirier, Ch. Saunders & J. Kincaid (eds),
Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 1–13, at 6.
30 See Burgess, n. 8 above, p. 119 (‘[a]dministrative (interlocking) federal practice’).
31 See F.W. Scharpf, B. Reissert & F. Schnabel, Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen
Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik (Scriptor Verlag, 1976), p. 21 (the seminal work defining the
German term ‘Politikverflechtung’, which loosely translates as ‘political and administrative
intertwinement’).
32 See, e.g., A. Vatter, Swiss Federalism: The Transformation of a Federal Model (Routledge, 2018), p. 65;
see Section 5.2 below.
33 See R. Roca, ‘Sonderbund’ (20 Dec. 2012), in Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse, available at:
https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/017241/2012-12-20.
34 Th. Maissen, ‘Fighting for Faith? Experiences of the Sonderbund Campaign 1847’, in J. Charnley &
M. Pender (eds), Switzerland and War (Lang, 1999), pp. 9–42, at 14.
35 Switzerland is thus a ‘federation’ (federal state) in all but its official name in three of the four national
languages as well as in English (‘Swiss Confederation’); see Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above,
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tantamount to a pragmatic compromise to peacefully accommodate the defeated can-
tons of the former Sonderbund in the federal state.36 The following constitutional prin-
ciples, unaltered since 1848, shape Switzerland’s characteristic small-scale federalism
with regard to climate change mitigation and beyond.
Symmetrical federalism
All 26 cantons have equal and original powers (symmetrical horizontal allocation of
powers).37 As a result of this symmetrical federalism, the Federal Parliament (the
Federal Assembly) consists of two chambers – the National Council and the Council
of States – each having identical powers. Each canton elects two members of the
Council of States, regardless of its size, except for six cantons that emerged from
partitions.38 The Federal Assembly elects the seven members of the executive branch
of the federal government (the Federal Council).39
Residual powers of the cantons
All powers not ascribed to the Federation by the Federal Constitution are retained by
the cantons.40 Expanding federal powers thus requires an amendment to the Federal
Constitution. All amendments to the Federal Constitution are subject to a referen-
dum.41 Such referenda demand a cumulative majority of both the voters and the can-
tons in order to be approved.42
Administrative interlocking43
The cantons not only implement their own laws but also those of the Federation –
subject to an explicit provision in the Federal Constitution or in federal statutory
law.44 Even in areas where the Federation has the ‘right to decide’ (power to
legislate, policy formulation), the cantons therefore usually retain the ‘right to act’
Arts 1 and 2(2) (in its national languages that are Romanic languages: Confédération suisse (French),
Confederazione Svizzera (Italian), Confederaziun svizra (Romansh)).
36 See Maissen, n. 4 above, pp. 200–2; Vatter, n. 32 above, pp. 169, 229.
37 See Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Arts 1 and 3.
38 Ibid., Arts 148(2) and 150(2).
39 Ibid., Art. 175(2).
40 Ibid., Art. 3, 1st sentence (the cantons exercising all powers not vested in the Federation).
41 J. Reich, ‘Switzerland: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in R. Albert et al. (eds), 2017 Global Review of
Constitutional Law (I•CONnect & Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston
College, 2018), pp. 280–5, at 280–3 (on Swiss direct democracy and its consequences), available at:
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-158512.
42 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Arts 3, 42(1) and 140(1a).
43 On the taxonomy see Section 2.1 above.
44 See Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 46(1) (stipulating that the ‘Cantons shall implement fed-
eral law in accordance with the Federal Constitution and federal legislation’ with the effect that the
Federation may, on the basis of either the Federal Constitution or federal statutory law, provide for an
implementation by its own [federal] administration. See, e.g., Swiss Federal Court, Decision 127 II 49,
26 Jan. 2001, s. 3, available at: https://www.bger.ch. The Swiss Federal Court is ‘the supreme judicial
authority’ of the Swiss Federation (Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 188(1)) and thus
Switzerland’s highest supreme court; see Reich, n. 41 above, p. 281.
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(policy implementation).45 This enables the cantons to partly adjust federal laws to
their own preferences, especially when the policy objectives are unclear or political
consensus is weak.46 Federal authorities lack any power to appoint or dismiss the
civil servants of the cantons implementing federal law.
Participation of the cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation
The cantons take part in the decision-making processes at the federal level.47 Each
canton has the right to be consulted on both important federal legislation and inter-
national treaties before the drafts are prepared and submitted to the Federal
Parliament.48This consultation procedure is owed largely to the right of eight cantons
or 50,000 citizens to launch a referendum against any federal statutory law and
most international treaties approved by the Federal Parliament.49 Empirically, such
optional referenda are launched against around a mere 6% of all legislative acts
that are constitutionally subject to this institution of direct democracy.50 Roughly
half of all federal acts actually put to an optional referendum have been vetoed at
the ballot box since 1874.51 The considerable political uncertainty fostered by the
optional referendum creates strong incentives to seek broad parliamentary consensus
on important policy issues by consulting with all relevant political groups, including
the cantons, at an early stage of the legislative process.52 Consequently, the Federal
45 On this distinction see D. Braun, ‘The Territorial Division of Power in Comparative Public Policy
Research: An Assessment’, in D. Braun (ed.), Public Policy and Federalism (Ashgate, 2000),
pp. 27–56, at 30; H. Keman, ‘Federalism and Policy Performance: A Conceptual and Empirical
Inquiry’, in U. Wachendorfer-Schmidt (ed.), Federalism and Political Performance (Routledge, 2000),
pp. 196–227, at 197.
46 See W. Linder & S. Mueller, Schweizerische Demokratie, 4th edn (Haupt Verlag, 2017), pp. 220–3;
P. Knoepfel, ‘Regulative Politik in föderativen Staaten: das Beispiel der Umweltpolitik’, in A. Benz &
G. Lehmbruch (eds), Föderalismus (Springer, 2002), pp. 306–32, at 311–2, 316; Vatter, n. 32 above,
pp. 58–9.
47 See Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 45.
48 Ibid., Art. 147; in more detail, Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure, 18 Mar. 2005, No. 172.061,
Art. 3; official titles: Bundesgesetz über das Vernehmlassungsverfahren (German), Loi fédérale sur la
procédure de consultation (French), Legge federale sulla procedura di consultazione (Italian), available
at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20032737/index.html (non-official English
translation).
49 See Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 141(1)(a) and (d).
50 See A.H. Trechsel & P. Sciarini, ‘Direct Democracy in Switzerland: Do Elites Matter?’ (1998) 33(1)
European Journal of Political Research, pp. 99–124, at 103–4.
51 A. Vatter, Das politische System der Schweiz, 3rd edn (Nomos, 2017), p. 370.
52 Trechsel& Sciarini, n. 50 above, p. 119 (finding that ‘[a] large consensus among the elite, elaborated dur-
ing the pre-parliamentary and the parliamentary phases of the legislative process, significantly reduces the
probability that a political actor shall attack a bill, forcing a popular vote’); A. Vatter, ‘Consensus and
Direct Democracy: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages’ (2000) 38(2) European Journal of Political
Research, pp. 171–92; A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries, 2nd edn (Yale University Press, 2012), p. 221; see also L. Neidhart, Plebiszit und
pluralitäre Demokratie: Eine Analyse der Funktion des schweizerischen Gesetzesreferendums (Francke,
1970), pp. 287–8, 313–4 (developing his canonical theory according to which the optional referendum
transferred Switzerland from a ‘plebiscitarian’ into a ‘bargaining’ democracy); A. Vatter,
R. Freiburghaus & A. Arens, ‘Coming a Long Way: Switzerland’s Transformation from a
Majoritarian to a Consensus Democracy (1848–2018) (2020) 27(6) Democratization, pp. 970–89, at
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Parliament almost always shies away from enacting a federal statutory law against
concerted opposition from the cantons.53
Taxing powers and fiscal autonomy
The cantons have their own financial resources, levying personal income and corporate
taxes set at their own rates.54 Tax competition is but one element of Switzerland’s
fiscal federalism. Cantons with ample resources and the Federation are all under a
constitutional obligation to finance substantial transfers to cantonswith fewer resources.55
Municipal autonomy
Municipalities (local government), of which there existed 2,172 at 1 January 2021,56
form a third layer of political governance below the Federation and the cantons. It is
for the cantons to determine the scope of municipal autonomy.57 Municipalities
have a dual role. On the one hand, they are autonomous units of self-government
and self-administration; on the other hand, they are answerable to their canton and
implement its laws and regulations. Overall, the municipalities in Switzerland are
found to be the most autonomous units of local government in Europe.58 They
spend about a quarter of Switzerland’s total public expenditure.59
3.      : 
   
3.1. Switzerland’s GHG Footprint and its Commitments under
International Law on Climate Change
Small-scale federalism as an enduring legacy of 1848, with its 26 cantons and 2,172
municipalities,60 bears witness to the truth of the observation made by Denis de
53 Vatter, n. 32 above, pp. 53–7, 78, 83; on the consultation procedure see Section 2.2 (‘Participation of the
cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation’) above.
54 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Arts 47(2) and 129(2) (expressively shielding the rates of direct
taxes from federal harmonization); see also Federal Finance Administration (FFA), ‘Swiss Public
Finances: 2018–2021’ (2020), p. 6, Fig. 1, and underlying link to table (stating that the cantons spent
40.6% and the Federation 32.7% of total public expenditure in 2018), available at: https://www.
newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/63087.pdf.
55 See Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 135 (on ‘equalization of financial resources and bur-
dens’) and, in more detail, Federal Act on the Equalization of Finances and Burden, 3 Oct. 2003,
No. 613.2; official titles: Bundesgesetz über den Finanz- und Lastenausgleich (German), Loi fédérale
sur la péréquation financière et la compensation des charges (French), Legge federale concernente la per-
equazione finanziaria e la compensazione degli oneri (Italian), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/
classified-compilation/20012239/index.html.
56 See Federal Statistical Office, ‘Répertoire officiel des communes de Suisse’, 17 Dec. 2020, available at:
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/bases-statistiques/repertoire-officiel-communes-suisse.assetdetail.
15264524.html.
57 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 50(1).
58 A. Ladner et al., Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 236 (ranking 36
European countries).
59 FFA, n. 54 above (22.3% in 2018).
60 See Section 1 above, incl. nn. 10 and 11.
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Rougemont, a cultural theorist and influential proponent of European unification, that
federalism rests ‘upon the fondness for complexity’.61 It also shapes the architecture of
domestic climate change law. As foreign relations are a federal power,62 the federal gov-
ernment represents the Swiss Confederation (Switzerland) – the Federation and the can-
tons in their entirety – at the international level as a subject of public international law.
The Federation is entitled to conclude international treaties on all subject matters.63
Norms of international treaties become part of Swiss federal law upon ratification
(‘monism’).64 In the domain of international law on climate change, Switzerland rati-
fied the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC),65 the 1997 Kyoto Protocol including the 2012 Doha Amendment,66
and the 2015 Paris Agreement.67 With regard to the latter, Switzerland pledged ‘to
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels’.68
Between 1990 and 2016, domestic GHG emissions decreased by 10% and stood at 5.6
tonnes of CO2 equivalents per capita in 2015.
69 Taking into account all consumption-
based emissions occurring on Swiss territory and abroad, including imported goods
and international air travel, Switzerland’s GHG footprint stands at 14 tonnes per capita
per year, well above the global average of 6 tonnes.70
In domestic law, the targets derived from Switzerland’s pledges under international
law and all measures to reduce those GHG emissions that are attributable to the use of
fossil fuels as energy sources are stipulated in the Federal Act on the Reduction of CO2
Emissions (Federal CO2 Act).
71 The Federal CO2 Ordinance,
72 issued by the Federal
Council, specifies the provisions of the Federal CO2Act. TheOrdinance sets out interim
reduction targets for the transport, industry, and building sectors73 in order to
61 Denis de Rougemont, ‘L’attitude fédéraliste’, in Rapport du premier congrès annuel de l’U.E.F. à
Montreux (1947), pp. 8–16, at 14 (‘Le fédéralisme repose sur l’amour de la complexité …’).
62 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 54(1).
63 See, e.g., Swiss Federal Court, n. 44 above, Decision 96 I 737, 23 Dec. 1970, s. 3.
64 See, e.g., Swiss Federal Court, n. 44 above, Decision 94 I 669, 22 Nov. 1968, s. 2.
65 New York (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/conveng.pdf (ratified by Switzerland on 10 Dec. 1993, No. 0.814.01, available at:
https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19920113/index.html; authentic French version).
66 N. 13 above.
67 Paris (France), 12 Dec. 2015, in force 4 Nov. 2016, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/eng-
lish_paris_agreement.pdf (ratified by Switzerland on 6 Oct. 2017, No. 0.814.012, available at:
https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/20162916/index.html (authentic French version)).
68 UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘Switzerland’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) and
Clarifying Information’, 27 Feb. 2015, p. 1, available at: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/
PublishedDocuments/Switzerland%20First/15%2002%2027_INDC%20Contribution%20of%20
Switzerland.pdf.
69 Swiss Federal Council, ‘Environment Switzerland 2018’, p. 83, available at: https://www.bafu.admin.ch/
er2018.
70 Ibid., p. 20.
71 Federal Act on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions, 23 Dec. 2011, No. 641.71; official titles: Bundesgesetz
über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen (German), Loi fédérale sur la réduction des émissions de
CO2 (French), Legge federale sulla riduzione delle emissioni di CO2 (Italian), available at:
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20091310/index.html (non-official English translation).
72 See Section 2.2 (‘Symmetrical federalism’) above.
73 Federal CO2 Ordinance, n. 13 above, Art. 3(1).
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continually assess whether Switzerland is on track to meet its overall targets. While
both the industry and building sectors met their interim targets by reducing their
GHG emissions by 18% and 26% respectively, the transport sector increased its emis-
sions by 4% compared with its 1990 level.74 As the main source of GHG emissions,
transport was responsible for 32% of all GHG emissions in 201575 and 37.7% of
Switzerland’s total energy consumption in 2019.76 Road transport (70.1%) and inter-
national air travel (27.5%) cause the vast majority of the sector’s GHG emissions, while
the share attributable to railways stands at less than 0.15%.77 This is largely as a result of
the remarkably light GHG footprint of the Swiss electricity sector, with 56.4% of total
electricity production in 2019 derived from hydropower, 35.2% from nuclear power,
4.2% from conventional thermal power and district heating plants, 4.2% from ‘new
renewable’ sources (wood, wind, solar, waste), and none from coal.78 Overall,
Switzerland is likely to have missed the target of reducing its GHG emissions by at least
20% by 2020measured against its 1990 levels, based on the most recent available data.79
3.2. Broad Federal Powers:
Federal CO2 Act as the Centrepiece of Domestic Climate Change Law
The Federal Constitution confers on the Federation substantial legislative powers
regarding mitigating climate change. Regulating the electricity market,80 the use of
energy by installations, vehicles and appliances,81 and nuclear energy82 are all federal
powers. The Federation, furthermore, may enact principles on ‘the use of local and
renewable energy sources’ and ‘the economic and efficient use of energy’.83 Limiting
federal powers to stipulate mere ‘principles’ as opposed to detailed regulation is a tech-
nique that the Swiss Federal Constitution often applies in the realm of environmental
protection, notably with regard to spatial planning, water conservation, fishing, hunt-
ing, and forest conservation.84This technique aims to strike a balance between ensuring
74 Swiss Federal Council, n. 69 above, p. 82.
75 Ibid.
76 Federal Office of Energy, ‘Statistique globale suisse de l’énergie 2019’ (2020), p. 10, available at:
https://www.bfe.admin.ch/bfe/fr/home/approvisionnement/statistiques-et-geodonnees/statistiques-de-lenergie/
statistique-globale-de-l-energie.html.
77 See Federal Office for the Environment, ‘Emissions de gaz à effet de serre de la Suisse 1990–2018’
(2020), available at: https://www.bafu.admin.ch/dam/bafu/fr/dokumente/klima/fachinfo-daten/THG_
Inventar_Daten.xlsx.download.xlsx/Evolution_emissions_GES_depuis_1990.xlsx.
78 Swiss Federal Office of Energy, ‘Statistique suisse de l’électricité 2019’ (2020), pp. 2, 6, available at:
https://www.bfe.admin.ch/bfe/fr/home/approvisionnement/statistiques-et-geodonnees/statistiques-
de-lenergie/statistique-de-l-electricite.html.
79 See Federal Office for the Environment, ‘Switzerland’s Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–2019: National
Inventory Report’ (2021), pp. 14–6, available at: https://www.bafu.admin.ch/dam/bafu/en/dokumente/
klima/klima-climatereporting/National_Inventory_Report_CHE.pdf.download.pdf/National_Inventory_
Report_CHE_2021.pdf. The inventory report covering 2020 is due to be published in Apr. 2022.
80 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 91(1) (transport and supply of electricity).
81 Ibid., Art. 89(3) 1st sentence.
82 Ibid., Art. 90.
83 Ibid., Art. 89(2).
84 Ibid., Arts 75(1), 76(2), 77(2) and 79.
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the same level of protection nationwide on the one hand, and granting the cantons dis-
cretion in adjusting the public interests at stake to local circumstances on the other
hand. Regulating energy consumption in buildings is an area in which the delimitation
of powers between the Federation and the cantons is ‘particularly complex’:85 the can-
tons are ‘primarily’ responsible, according to the text of the Federal Constitution.86
Federal statutory law not only commits the cantons to make use of their powers87
but also to file a yearly report with the Federal administration on the measures taken.88
Together with various federal powers on energy policy,89 the federal power on the
protection of the environment90 forms the constitutional basis of the Federal CO2
Act.91 This comprehensive enactment, initially entered into force on 1 May 2000,92
constitutes the centrepiece of Swiss domestic climate change law. On 25 September
2020, the Federal Parliament adopted a total revision of the Act for the period beyond
2020.93 The CO2 levy provided for by the Federal CO2 Act forms ‘the backbone of
Swiss climate policy’.94 The levy is collected on the production, extraction and import
of ‘thermal fuels’ (heating oil, natural gas, coal, and so on) as opposed to ‘motor fuels‘
(petrol, diesel, kerosene, and so on).95 The rate of the levy has risen to Swiss francs
(CHF) 96 (EUR 90/USD 106) per tonne of CO2 since 2018
96 and may increase to
CHF 120, depending on whether interim reduction targets are met.97 According to
85 Swiss Federal Court, n. 44 above, Decision 1C_36/2011, 8 Feb. 2012, s. 3.2 (‘ausgesprochen komplex’).
86 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 89(3) (‘vor allem’ (German), ‘au premier chef’ (French), ‘in
primo luogo’ (Italian)). See generally J. Reich, ‘Auslegungmehrsprachigen Rechts unter den Bedingungen
der Polyglossie in der Schweiz’, in F. Schorkopf & Ch. Starck (eds), Rechtsvergleichung – Sprache –
Rechtsdogmatik (Nomos, 2019), pp. 145–73 (on multilingualism and legal interpretation), available
at: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-179151.
87 Federal Act on Energy, 30 Sept. 2016, No. 730.0, Art. 45; official titles: Energiegesetz (German), Loi sur
l’énergie (French), Legge federale sull’energia (Italian), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classi-
fied-compilation/20121295/index.html.
88 Art. 9(3) of the revised Federal CO2 Act of 25 Sept. 2020 (Federal CO2 Act (revised)), ‘Loi fédérale sur la
réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre’, Federal Gazette 2020, pp. 7607–46, available at:
https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/2020/2013/fr; Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Art. 9(2); Federal
CO2 Ordinance, n. 13 above, Art. 16.
89 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 89.
90 Ibid., Art. 74(1).
91 See Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above, Preamble; Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Preamble.
92 See Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, in its initial version of 8 Oct. 1999 ((2000) Recueil officiel du droit
fédéral 979), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/official-compilation/2000/979.pdf.
93 Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above. As an optional referendum (see Section 2.2 (‘Participation of the
cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation’)) was launched against the revised Federal
CO2-Act, a popular vote on the bill will take place on 13 June 2021; see Swiss Federal Council,
‘Objets de la votation populaire du 13 juin 2021’, 3 Feb. 2021, available at: https://www.admin.ch/
gov/fr/accueil/documentation/communiques.msg-id-82214.html. The Federal Council will put the
revised Federal CO2 Act into force should the referendum fail: Federal CO2 Act (revised), ibid., Art.
87(2).
94 See Swiss Federal Council, ‘Message relatif à la révision totale de la loi sur le CO2 pour la
période postérieure à 2020 du 1er décembre 2017’, Federal Gazette 2018, pp. 229–372, at 244
(‘… la pièce maîtresse de la politique climatique suisse …’), available at: https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/
accueil/droit-federal/feuille-federale.html.
95 See Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Art. 29(1) in conjunction with (i.c.w.) Art. 2(1) and (2).
96 Ibid., Art. 29(1) i.c.w. Federal CO2 Ordinance, n. 13 above, Art. 94(1) c/1.
97 See Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Art. 29(2) i.c.w. Federal CO2 Ordinance, n. 13 above, Art. 94.
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the text of the revised Federal CO2 Act, this rate may increase to a ceiling of CHF 210
per tonne of CO2 in 2021,
98whereas a new levy onmotor fuels would increase the price
of gasoline by up to CHF 0.12 per litre by 2025.99 Similarly, a new levy on commercial
passenger flights would increase the price of a ticket by between CHF 30 to 120, while
certain private flights would be taxed at a rate of between CHF 500 to 3,000.100
Designed as an incentive tax, approximately two thirds of the revenue from the CO2
levy are redistributed to both the resident population and the companies residing in
Switzerland, independent of consumption.101 The remaining third of revenues is
invested into a climate fund to promote CO2 reduction measures in the building sector,
secure loans for companies to develop and market equipment and processes to reduce
GHG emissions, and subsidize measures to prevent damage to persons or property of
considerable value that may arise as a consequence of the increased concentration of
GHGs in the atmosphere.102 The emissions trading scheme established by the
Federal CO2 Act (Swiss ETS)
103 has been linked to the European Union Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS) since 1 January 2020.104
3.3. Administrative Interlocking between the Federation and the Cantons:
Implementing Federal Climate Change Law
As a result of the administrative interlocking between the Federation and the cantons as
one of the core principles of Swiss federalism, the constitutionally ascribed federal
power to legislate on climate change mitigation does not necessarily entail a corre-
sponding power of the Federation to execute such laws by its own administration.
Rather, it is for the cantons to implement and execute federal law, subject to an explicit
provision by federal constitutional or federal statutory law to the contrary.105 The
Federal CO2 Act, however, provides for exactly such an exception to the rule and
entrusts its implementation to the Federal Administration in general106 and to the
Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) in particular.107 When the Federal CO2
98 See Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above, Art. 34(2).
99 Ibid., Art. 30(4).
100 Ibid., Arts 44(1) and 51(1).
101 Ibid., Art. 53(2); Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Arts 15–21.
102 See Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above, Arts 53–58; Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Arts 31–32;
Federal CO2 Ordinance, n. 13 above, Arts 34–36.
103 See Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above, Arts 21–29; Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Arts 15–21;
Federal CO2 Ordinance, n. 13 above, Arts 40–65.
104 Agreement between the EuropeanUnion and the Swiss Confederation on the Linking of their Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Trading Systems, Bern (Switzerland), 23. Nov 2017, in force 1 Jan. 2020, available at:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A22017A1207%2801%29 (ratified
by Switzerland on 9. Dec. 2019, No. 0.814.011.268, available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classi-
fied-compilation/20173209/index.html).
105 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 74(3) (regarding environmental protection); see also Section
2.2 above.
106 Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above, Art. 62(1); Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Art. 39(1); see Section
3.1 above.
107 Federal CO2Act (revised), n. 88 above, Art. 62(6); Federal CO2Act, n. 71 above, Art. 39(4) (according to
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Act was drafted in its initial form in 1997, the Federal Council108 argued that implemen-
tation by the Federal Administration would ‘keep enforcement as simple as possible’ and
would ‘ensure that companies … operating nationwide’ at various sites ‘in several can-
tons’ would be in a position to commit themselves to the then only voluntary schemes
to reduceGHGemissions.109The responsibility to ensure that CO2 emissions from ‘build-
ings that are heated with fossil fuels’ are reduced in compliance with the targets set out in
the Federal CO2 Ordinance nevertheless rests with the cantons.
110 The same applies for
most areas covered by the Federal Environmental Protection Act (Federal EPA),111 with
the exception of tasks closely related to climate change mitigation law, such as environ-
mental tax incentives and emission limits for thermal and motor fuels.112 In matters of
environmental law implemented by the cantons, the FOEN regularly publishes detailed
guidelines specifying the provisions set out by federal environmental law in order to
limit the exercise of discretion by the administrative agencies of the cantons.113
3.4. Municipalities: Public Providers of Goods and Services
Municipalities are autonomous yet they implement the laws of the canton towhich they
belong.114 In most cantons it is the municipalities that provide services such as waste
management as well as the supply of electricity, water, and natural gas to both private
households and industry. Most municipalities established their own public utility com-
panies in the second half of the 19th century in order to crowd out privatemonopolies in
these industries.115 At around the turn of the 20th century many cantons and urban
municipalities established state-owned enterprises to build and operate hydropower
plants and, beginning in the 1970s, nuclear power stations.116
3.5. Concluding Analysis: Flexible Administrative Interlocking
In contrast to the usual constitutional implementation arrangement, the Federal CO2
Act is largely implemented by the Federal Administration. In view of Switzerland’s
108 See Section 2.2 (‘Symmetrical federalism’) above.
109 See Swiss Federal Council, ‘Message relatif à la loi fédérale sur la réduction des émissions de CO2 du 17
mars 1997’, Federal Gazette 1997 III, pp. 395–466, at 444 (transl.), available at: https://www.fedlex.
admin.ch/eli/fga/1997/3_410_395_370/fr.
110 Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above, Art. 9; Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Art. 9(1); on the Federal
CO2 Ordinance, n. 13 above, see Section 3.1 above.
111 Federal Act on the Protection of the Environment, 7 Oct. 1983, No. 814.01 (Federal EPA), Art. 9(2); offi-
cial titles: Bundesgesetz über den Umweltschutz (German), Loi fédérale sur la protection de l’environne-
ment’ (French), Legge federale sulla protezione dell’ambiente (Italian), available at: https://www.admin.
ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19830267/index.html (non-official English translation); see also
n. 105 above.
112 Ibid., Arts 42(2) and 41(1).
113 Ibid., Art. 38 (title); see in more detail A. Griffel, Umweltrecht, 2nd edn (Dike, 2019), pp. 10–46.
114 See Section 2.2 (‘Municipal autonomy’) above.
115 J. Reich, Grundsatz der Wirtschaftsfreiheit (Dike, 2011), pp. 130–3; D. Kurz, ‘Services industriels’
(1 Dec. 2010), in Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse, available at: https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/
026450/2010-12-01.
116 Reich, n. 115 above, pp. 132–3; S. Paquier, ‘Sociétés électriques’ (26 Jan. 2016), in Dictionnaire histor-
ique de la Suisse, available at: https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/042014/2016-01-26.
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small-scale federalism, this solution can be justified not only by the demands of pri-
vate companies with sites in several cantons117 but also on practical grounds. The
administration of financial incentives such as the CO2 levy or the Swiss ETS
118 by
26 different administrative agencies would involve extensive effort and require each
of these agencies to have specialized expertise at their disposal. The architecture of
domestic climate change law therefore indicates that the constitutional framework
of federalism in place since 1848 provides for both stability and, with regard to the
implementation of laws, a degree of flexibility. Administrative interlocking between
the Federation and the cantons thus remains an important feature of climate change
law as it is, first and foremost, for the cantons to regulate energy consumption in build-
ings119 – a sector responsible for 30.3% of all CO2 emissions
120 and for 41.6% of all
energy consumption.121 At the same time, the revenues from the CO2 levy, collected
by the Federation, are the main source of the subsidies paid out by the cantons to land-
owners for investments to reduce the GHG emissions of their buildings.122 This com-
plex intertwining extends all the way to the municipalities. As providers of goods and
services, including electricity and natural gas,123 municipalities have a major role to
play in domestic climate change law, as will be discussed in more detail below.124
4.     
 
4.1. Economic Approaches to Federalism: ‘One View of the Cathedral’
The intertwining of powers and tasks across three layers of governance invites the ques-
tion of the rationale for such complex arrangements. Certain strands of literature on
federalism, rooted in political and constitutional economics, seek to identify how
legal norms and institutions of federalism interact with individual behaviour.125
Such ‘economic approaches to federalism’126 centre mainly on the effects of
117 For this official explanation see Section 3.3 above, including n. 109.
118 See Section 3.2 above.
119 See Section 3.3 above.
120 Federal Office for the Environment, ‘Émissions de gaz à effet de serre visées par la loi sur le CO2 révisée et
par le Protocole de Kyoto (…) (2013–2020)’ (2020), pp. 15–6, available at: https://www.bafu.admin.ch/
dam/bafu/fr/dokumente/klima/fachinfo-daten/CO2_Statistik.pdf.download.pdf/CO2_Publikation_fr_2019-
07.pdf.
121 Swiss Federal Office of Energy, ‘Analyse des schweizerischen Energieverbrauchs 2000–2019 nach
Verwendungszwecken’ (2020), p. 64, available at: https://www.bfe.admin.ch/bfe/en/home/supply/statis-
tics-and-geodata/energy-statistics/analysis-of-energy-consumption-by-specific-use.html.
122 See Section 3.2 above.
123 See Section 3.4 above.
124 See Sections 6.1–6.3 below.
125 See, e.g., S. Voigt, ‘Positive Constitutional Economics II: A Survey of Recent Developments’ (2011)
146(1–2) Public Choice, pp. 205–56, at 205–13, 230–4 (for an overview of positive constitutional
economics and an analysis of federalism on those grounds).
126 See R.P. Inman & D.L. Rubinfield, ‘Economics of Federalism’, in F. Parisi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook
of Law and Economics, Vol. 3: Public Law and Legal Institutions (Oxford University Press, 2017),
pp. 84–105, at 84 (‘economic theory of federalism’).
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competition between different political entities within a federal polity.127While the aim
of climate change policies – to reduce GHG emissions – is clearly defined by the com-
mitments made under international law,128 there are multiple policy options to achieve
this goal. The insights provided by economic approaches centring on competition
between political entities can therefore enable considerations of whether the architec-
ture of Swiss climate change law is likely to deliver beneficial effects. The underlying
concept of public goods economy resembling a marketplace, as sketched below, offers
but ‘one view of the cathedral’,129 and thus conveys, as any other theoretical and ana-
lytical approach would, one of several possible perspectives.
4.2. Competition in the Public Provision of Goods and Services
According to economic approaches to federalism, one of the major benefits of federal-
ism is derived from the theoretically plausible assumption that subnational entities can
be expected to have accurate knowledge about both the preferences of the citizens
and their willingness to pay with regard to goods and services provided by the
government.130 This premise forms the analytical justification for organizing the
powers of the various federal units according to the principle of subsidiarity.131 It pre-
sumes the ability of local governments to tailor their provision of government goods
and services to the preferences of the local population. At the same time, as the trans-
action costs for an individual to exit a constituent unit are generally thought to be mar-
ginal in a federal state, the option of any resident ‘to vote with his or her feet’ and exit the
territorial entity in question would compel local governments to provide their services
efficiently.132 The same restrictive incentives would apply for local governments as to
taxes, which embody the price for government services. As subnational governments
of a federation compete for taxpaying citizens, they can be reasonably expected to
have an incentive to cater for the preferences of these citizens and to set the price of
their services accordingly.133 Empirical studies testing the theoretical expectation that
127 See Voigt, n. 125 above, p. 230 (stating that ‘[i]n a nutshell, the conjectured economic benefits of feder-
alism are expected to arise from the competition between constituent governments’).
128 See Section 3.1 above.
129 G. Calabresi & A.D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review, pp. 1089–128, at 1089–90, incl. fn 3 (from whom the
phrase is derived, alluding to Claude Monet’s series of paintings, made in 1892 and 1893, of
the Cathedral of Rouen, region of Normandy (France), from different perspectives at various times of
the day).
130 W.E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. 12.
131 Inman&Rubinfeld, n. 23 above, p. 38. In this regard see Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 5a
(according to which the principle of subsidiarity must be observed when government tasks are being allo-
cated) and more specifically Art. 43a (on the allocation of tasks between the different layers of
governance).
132 W.E. Oates, ‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism’ (1999) 37(3) Journal of Economic Literature, pp. 1120–49,
at 1123 (outlining the theoretical framework); H.S. Banzhaf & R.P. Walsh, ‘Do People Vote with Their
Feet? An Empirical Test of Tiebout’ (2008) 98(3) American Economic Review, pp. 843–63 (finding
strong empirical support that households ‘vote with their feet’ regarding environmental quality); on
‘exit’ see A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations,
and States (Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 22–9.
133 See Ch. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64(5) Journal of Political Economy,
pp. 416–24; see also Inman & Rubinfeld, n. 23 above, pp. 38–44, 57–63 (on the specific requirements
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such federal competition would actually induce a moderating effect on public spending,
however, have shown mixed evidence.134
4.3. Regulatory Competition and Policy Innovation
Competition between subnational entities of a federal state not only extends to tax pol-
icy but to regulation more broadly. Federalism allows citizens to compare the perform-
ance of their own local government with that of another, which in turn may encourage
local politicians and civil servants to adopt more efficient and beneficial policies (yard-
stick competition).135 This would turn constituent units into ‘laboratories’ experiment-
ing with different public policies, allowing for beneficial policy innovation.136
Incentives for such ‘laboratory federalism’,137 however, are weakened by the fact
that many policy innovations are not only risky and costly but may be easily copied
when proved successful.138 This invites free riding and may justify subsidies by the cen-
tral government to support innovating subnational entities.139 Whether, and to what
degree, the theoretical expectation of yardstick competition within federal entities
translates into practical results,140 and whether competition would enhance or rather
weaken environmental standards, is disputed. The economic appeal of a sizeable internal
market within a jurisdiction that is committed to high environmental standards may,
under specific circumstances, trigger a federal dynamic leading to more ambitious envir-
onmental protection, as it is often inefficient to design products in compliance with mul-
tiple regulatory standards.141 According to some authors, the 1970 US Clean Air Act142
leading to such effects and on the failure of the traditional model to explain howmerit goods such as edu-
cation, housing, or public safety may be provided by local governments).
134 For a generally positive assessment see Inman&Rubinfeld, n. 23 above, pp. 44–8 (reviewing various more
recent studies on the US); G. Brennan & J. M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a
Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 168, 216; M. Brülhart & M. Jametti, ‘Does
Tax Competition Tame the Leviathan?’ (2019) 177(C) Journal of Public Economics, pp. 1–16, at 13–5;
S. Mueller, A. Vatter & T. Arnold, ‘State Capture from Below? The Contradictory Effects of
Decentralisation on Public Spending’ (2017) 37(4) Journal of Public Policy, pp. 363–400, at 376–83;
but see W.E. Oates, ‘Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study’ (1985) 75(4) American Economic
Review, pp. 748–57, at 756 (according to whom ‘a strong, systematic relationship between the size of gov-
ernment and the degree of centralization of the public sector … does not exist’).
135 On the theory of yardstick competition see A. Shleifer, ‘ATheory of Yardstick Competition’ (1985) 16(3)
Rand Journal of Economics, pp. 319–27.
136 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
137 Oates, n. 132 above, p. 1121.
138 See, e.g., S. Callander & B. Harstad, ‘Experimentation in Federal Systems’ (2015) 130(2) The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, pp. 951–1002, at 952–7, 987–8.
139 K.S. Strumpf, ‘Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?’ (2002) 4(2) Journal of
Public Economic Theory, pp. 207–41; Inman & Rubinfeld, n. 23 above, p. 49.
140 See, e.g., C. Volden, ‘States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s Health Insurance
Program’ (2006) 50(2) American Journal of Political Science, pp. 294–312, at 310 (finding strong evi-
dence that states with successful policies are more likely to be emulated); S. Rose-Ackerman, ‘Risk
Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?’ (1980) 9(3) Journal of Legal Studies,
pp. 593–616, at 614–6; H.J. Wiseman & D. Owen, ‘Federal Laboratories of Democracy’ (2018) 52(2)
UC Davis Law Review, pp. 1119–191.
141 D. Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Harvard
University Press, 1995), p. 268.
142 Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970).
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illustrates the beneficial results of such federal interstate competition.143 The Act allowed
California to enact stricter car emissions standards, which were later adopted by the fed-
eral government, only to provoke the next cycle of ‘iterative federalism’ during which the
federal government once again aligned itselfwith the higherCalifornian standard.144This
ability of the State of California, revoked by the Trump administration in 2019,145 to
effectively set the regulatory standards for the whole nation as a result of both its sizeable
internal market and its policy of promoting stricter environmental regulation was coined
the ‘California effect’.146 In contrast to this dynamic, some scholars argue that federalism
would result in lower standards, particularly in the realm of environmental policy. This
more sceptical perspective is fuelled by the analytical assumption that any subnational
entity, in rationally pursuing its narrow self-interest, would opt against higher environ-
mental protection for fear of capital moving to other entities with lower and less costly
standards.147 Regulatory competition in environmental matters would thus create
‘pollution havens’148 situated in entities with the weakest environmental regulation.149
While the empirical evidence on whether regulatory competition spurs such downward
spirals within federal polities has so far remained mixed and unsystematic, most studies
nonetheless point to a degree of strategic interaction between subnational entities,
meaning that politicians tend to discern changes in environmental regulations in other jur-
isdictions when reviewing their own policies, albeit only as one of several relevant
considerations.150
143 See, e.g., A.E. Carlson, ‘Iterative Federalism and Climate Change’ (2009) 10(3)Northwestern University
Law Review, pp. 1097–162, at 1099, 1109–28; Vogel, n. 141 above, pp. 249, 259, 268.
144 Vogel, n. 141 above, pp. 249, 259, 268; P.G. Fredriksson&D.L.Millimet, ‘Is There a “California Effect”
in US Environmental Policymaking?’ (2002) 32(6) Regional Science and Urban Economics, pp. 737–64,
at 760–1 (with a more cautious assessment).
145 US Environmental Protection Agency Press Office, ‘Trump Administration Announces One National
Program Rule on Federal Preemption of State Fuel Economy Standards’, 19 Sept. 2019, available at:
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/trump-administration-announces-one-national-program-rule-federal-
preemption-state-fuel; for an assessment see J.H. Adler, ‘Uncooperative Environmental Federalism 2.0’
(2020) 71(5) Hastings Law Journal, pp. 1101–26, at 1119–23.
146 Vogel, n. 141 above, p. 5.
147 R.B. Stewart, ‘Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy’ (1977) 86(6) Yale Law Journal, pp. 1196–272, at 1212; for a review
of more recent literature see B.R. Dijkstra & P.G. Fredriksson, ‘Regulatory Environmental Federalism’
(2010) 2(1) Annual Review of Resource Economics, pp. 319–39, at 328–30.
148 B.R. Copeland&M.S. Taylor, ‘Trade, Growth, and the Environment’ (2004) 42(1) Journal of Economic
Literature, pp. 7–71, at 9.
149 See D.C. Esty, ‘Revitalizing Environmental Federalism’ (1996) 95(3) Michigan Law Review, pp. 570–
653, at 627–36; but see R.L. Revesz, ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice
Analysis’ (2001) 115(2) Harvard Law Review, pp. 553–641; more nuanced, S. Wälti, ‘How Multilevel
Structures Affect Environmental Policy in Industrialized Countries’ (2004) 43(4) European Journal of
Political Research, pp. 599–634, at 624–6; and Inman & Rubinfeld, n. 23 above, p. 287–92.
150 See, inter alia, W.E. Oates & P.R. Portney, ‘The Political Economy of Environmental Policy’, in
K.-G. Mäler & J.R. Vincent (eds), Handbook of Environmental Economics, Vol. 1 (Elsevier, 2003),
pp. 325–54, at 346 (according to whom evidence for a ‘race to the bottom’ remained ‘largely anecdotal’);
for a nuanced empirical assessment see Wälti, n. 149 above; see also S.J. Basinger & M. Hallerberg,
‘Remodelling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom’
(2004) 98(2) American Political Science Review, pp. 261–76; D.M. Konisky, ‘Regulatory Competition
and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?’ (2007) 51(4) American Journal of
Political Science, pp. 853–72, at 869; for a sceptical view see K.H. Engel, ‘State Environmental
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4.4. Concluding Analysis: Broad Federal Powers, Constrained Federal Competition
The economic approach to federalism emphasizes, above all, the beneficial effects of
competition between federal units for society and the individual alike. In the context
of Swiss federalism, these advantageous consequences are most likely to be relevant
for the provision of public goods, as it is mainly the municipalities that supply electri-
city, drinking water, and natural gas.151 Citizens, furthermore, have the right to
participate in referenda and to launch popular initiatives (direct democracy) at all
three levels of Swiss federalism. Citizens are thus entitled to take part in the decision-
making process relating to matters such as the level of taxes or investment in local
infrastructure.152 While the public provision of goods and services is an area where
one can reasonably expect a degree of competition on the basis of insights provided
by economic approaches to federalism, such effects appear less likely in the context
of Switzerland’s environmental policy. The broad federal powers for environmental
protection153 can be expected largely to forestall regulatory competition in this
realm. This applies even to the regulation of energy consumption in buildings, for
which the cantons are in principle responsible, as the Federation not only has spelled
out interim targets for the building sector to reduceGHG emissions, butmoreover com-
mits the cantons to report on the measures taken to reach these targets.154 Apart from
the federal powers and provisions, analytical considerations do not warrant the
assumption that a canton would be in a position to project its influence beyond its
own borders according to the model of the aforementioned California effect,155 as
none of the cantons have an internal market large enough to set regulatory standards
for other cantons.156 In contrast to frameworks of dualist federalism,157 the cantons
project their influence less through competition than through both their use of discre-
tion when implementing federal law158 and their individual and collective participation
in policy formulation at the federal level.159
Standard-Setting: Is There a Race and Is It to the Bottom?’ (1996) 48(2)Hastings Law Journal, pp. 271–
398, at 374–6.
151 See Section 3.4 above.
152 See J. Reich, ‘Direkte Demokratie und völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen im Konflikt’ (2008) 46(1)
Heidelberg Journal of International Law, pp. 979–1025, at 985–98, available at: https://doi.org/10.
5167/uzh-65343; see also Reich, n. 41 above, p. 280.
153 See Section 3.2 above.
154 See Section 3.2 above.
155 See Section 4.3 above.
156 See also R. Steurer, C. Clar & J. Casado-Asensio, ‘Climate Change Mitigation in Austria and
Switzerland: The Pitfalls of Federalism in Greening Decentralized Building Policies’ (2020) 44(1)
Natural Resources Forum, pp. 89–108, at 100 (identifying a ‘lack of mutual learning and subnational
policy diffusion from pioneers to laggards’ in their empirical study in line with the above analysis).
157 See Section 2.1 above.
158 See Section 2.2 (‘Participation of the cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation’) above.
159 See Section 2.2 (‘Administrative interlocking’) above, and Section 5.3 below.
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5. - :  
  -
5.1. Symmetrical Federalism Despite Asymmetries
Competition between federal entities not only presupposes legal autonomy at the sub-
national level but requires all layers of federalism to have the governmental and admin-
istrative capacity to make effective use of their autonomy. Such administrative expertise
plays a pivotal role in highly technical matters such as implementing climate change
mitigation law.160 As a result of Switzerland’s small-scale federalism, all cantons are
accorded similar powers but, on account of their small size, they often lack governmen-
tal and administrative capacity.161 Disparities among the cantons have substantially
increased since 1848 when ‘symmetrical federalism’ was adopted as a constitutional
principle.162 In 2020, six of the 26 cantons accounted for 59% of Switzerland’s entire
population.163 In the same year, the permanent residential population of the largest
canton exceeded the smallest by a factor of 96, whereas this number stood at 43
more than a century ago.164 Twenty of the 26 cantons have a permanent residential
population of below half a million people while the population of only two cantons –
Zurich and Berne – exceeds one million.165 In 2020 the smallest municipality of
Switzerland was inhabited by a dozen citizens; the most populous – the City of Zurich
– counted roughly half a million inhabitants.166
5.2. Horizontal Cooperative Federalism: Pooling Administrative Resources
while Keeping the Federation at Bay
On account of scarce administrative capacity and in an effort to represent collectively
their interests at the federal level, cantons have increasingly pooled their administrative
and governmental resources in institutionalized networks.167 The Federal Constitution
expressively underscores this right of the cantons to ‘establish common organisations
and institutions’.168 Formally, such organizations are often established as associations
160 See Section 3.5 above.
161 See, e.g., Vatter, n. 32 above, p. 60.
162 See Section 2.2 above.
163 Own calculation based on Federal Statistical Office, n. 11 above.
164 Ibid., and own calculation based on the data of 1 Dec. 1888 according to Statistical Bureau of the Federal
Department of Home Affairs, Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz 1891 (Orell Fuessli, 1891), p. 1, avail-
able at: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfsstatic/dam/assets/346245/master.
165 Own calculation based on Federal Statistical Office, n. 11 above.
166 See Regionalporträts 2020: Kennzahlen aller Gemeinden (2020), (City of Zurich [415,367 inhabitants]
v. Corippo [11 inhabitants]), available at https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/regional-statis-
tics/regional-portraits-key-figures/communes/data-explanations.assetdetail.11587763.html.
167 See, e.g., N. Bolleyer, ‘Consociationalism and Intergovernmental Relations: Linking Internal and
External Power-Sharing in the Swiss Federal Polity’ (2006) 12(3) Swiss Political Science Review,
pp. 1–34, at 11–22; K. Füglister & F. Wasserfallen, ‘Swiss Federalism in a Changing Environment’
(2014) 12(4) Comparative European Politics, pp. 404–21, at 406–9; J. Schnabel & S. Mueller,
‘Vertical Influence or Horizontal Coordination? The Purpose of Intergovernmental Councils in
Switzerland’ (2017) 27(5) Regional & Federal Studies, pp. 549–72; Vatter, n. 32 above, pp. 73–83.
168 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 48(1).
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of federal private law. These intergovernmental networks, which are usually referred to
as ‘conferences’, thus transcend the structures of public law that embed Swiss federal-
ism.169Deliberations within such conferences are reserved formembers of the executive
branches of the cantons and are closed to the public. The public is rarely consulted
regarding documents of legal relevance, and the same goes for members of parliaments.
The dominant role of the executive branches at the expense of the legislature, and the
lack of transparency, public scrutiny and democratic accountability, have frequently
attracted criticism.170 The cantons nevertheless perceive horizontal cooperation as an
effective strategy not only to fend off additional federal powers but also to alleviate
their strained administrative resources.171
In 1979, all 26 cantons established the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Energy
Directors (CDEn) as an intergovernmental council to coordinate energy laws and pol-
icies.172 In view of the primary responsibility of the cantons to regulate energy con-
sumption in buildings173 and the interim target for the reduction of GHG emissions
in the building sector set down by federal law,174 the CDEn issued a detailed, non-
binding model law on energy efficiency standards in buildings (MoPEC 2014).175 As
in other instances of horizontal cooperative federalism, each member of the CDEn
has one vote.176 This transforms each of the 26 cantons into a veto player177 regardless
of its size or administrative resources, thereby increasing the likelihood that the cantons
will agree only on the lowest common denominator when deciding on guidelines such
as MoPEC 2014. The unanimity requirement may consequently lead to various insti-
tutional pathologies that are often associated with intertwined decision-making struc-
tures of cooperative federalism.178 Organizations of cooperative federalism may thus
lose their collective capacity to reach optimal decisions or end in political stalemate
altogether. In line with these theoretically and analytically founded expectations, the
few empirical studies on the issue provide a rather bleak assessment of horizontal
cooperative federalism, fuelling the claim that the significant GHG reductions in the
169 But see Schnabel & Mueller, n. 167 above, p. 552; Vatter, n. 32 above, p. 75 (according to whom ‘con-
ferences’ are as such ‘located outside the formal framework of Swiss federalism’).
170 For a brief assessment see Vatter, n. 32 above, pp. 71–3.
171 Vatter, n. 32 above, pp. 66–8.
172 ‘Conférences des directeurs cantonaux de l’énergie (CDEn)’, available at: https://www.endk.ch/fr. The
English terminology is derived from Vatter, n. 32 above, p. 76.
173 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 89(3); see Section 3.2 above.
174 See Section 3.1 above.
175 CDEn, ‘Modèle de prescriptions énergétiques des cantons (MoPEC)’, 9 Jan. 2015, available at:
https://www.endk.ch/fr/politique-energetique/mopec?set_language=fr.
176 Statuts de la CDEn [Articles of Association], Art. 4(2), available at: https://www.endk.ch/de/ablage/endk-
1/20200402_EnDK%20Statuten_d_f_.pdf.
177 See G. Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton University Press, 2002),
pp. 136–43 (on ‘veto players’ in federal systems in general).
178 F.W. Scharpf, ‘Die Politikverflechtungs-Falle: Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus im
Vergleich’ (1985) 26(4) Politische Vierteljahresschrift, pp. 323–56, at 337–8 (identifying the unanimity
requirement as the main source of the problem-solving deficit of cooperative federalism in both Germany
and the European Community).
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building sector of 26% by 2015, compared with the 1990 level,179 were achieved ‘des-
pite, not because of’ interaction between the cantons.180
5.3. Federal Pre-emption: Vertical Incentives for More Stringent Regulation
within Horizontal Cooperative Federalism
When the cantons, organized in institutions of horizontal cooperative federalism such
as the CDEn, fail to agree on guidelines in line with the interim targets spelled out in the
Federal CO2Ordinance, this carries the risk of triggering federal regulation. Federal law
takes precedence over the conflicting law of a canton.181 The latter is thus void and
without effect when it is in contradiction with federal law (‘federal pre-emption’).182
The federal level has broad powers in respect of both environmental protection and
energy policy. With regard to energy consumption in buildings, it is the cantons that
are, according to the vaguewording of the Federal Constitution, ‘primarily’ responsible
for enacting laws.183 The Federation is hence under a constitutional obligation to
refrain from unduly exercising its powers. As explained above, such restraint is equally
due on political grounds, given the right of eight cantons to launch a referendum
against any federal statutory law.184 As a result of this optional referendum, the
Federation hardly ever succeeds in overcoming concerted opposition from the cantons
on specific policy issues.185 Legally, the Federal Parliament is nonetheless entitled to
enact federal laws should it consider the guidelines of the cantons to be insufficient
in respect of the interim targets for the building sector.186 The less closed the ranks
of the cantons are on the issue, the more likely it is that the Federal Parliament will
adopt federal regulations. Since the cantons usually prefer to prevent federal interven-
tion, the shadow of federal pre-emption incentivizes the cantons and the CDEn alike to
avoid adopting standards that could be deemed insufficient. In line with analytical
assumptions, empirical studies mainly credit formal and informal interventions by
the Federation with the substantial reductions of GHG emissions achieved in the build-
ing sector.187
179 See Section 3.1 above.
180 Steurer, Clar & Casado-Asensio, n. 156 above, p. 100; J. Casado-Asensio & R. Steurer, ‘Mitigating
Climate Change in a Federal Country Committed to the Kyoto Protocol: How Swiss Federalism
Further Complicated an Already Complex Challenge’ (2016) 49(3) Policy Sciences, pp. 257–79, at 257.
181 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 49(1).
182 See, e.g., Swiss Federal Court, n. 44 above, Decision 145 I 26, 22 Jan. 2019, ss. 3.1 and 8.4. The term
‘federal pre-emption’ is derived from US constitutional law; see, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law, 6th edn (Aspen, 2019), pp. 419–43.
183 See Section 3.2 above.
184 See Section 2.2 (‘Participation of the cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation’) above.
185 Ibid.
186 See Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above, Art. 55, and Federal CO2 Act, n. 71 above, Art. 34 (both
under the heading ‘Reduction of CO2 emissions from buildings’) and Federal EPA, n. 111 above,
Art. 12(1)(a) and (d) (according to which the Federation may limit emissions by issuing ‘maximum emis-
sion values’ and ‘regulations on construction and equipment’).
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This strategic interplay between guidelines drafted within institutions of horizontal
federalism and federal pre-emption can be observed in the total revision of the Federal
CO2Act adopted by the Swiss Federal Parliament on 25 September 2020.
188Regarding
the replacement of oil or natural gas heating systems in buildings, the MoPEC 2014
guidelines, drafted by the CDEn on behalf of the cantons, stipulate that 10% of current
energy consumption must be compensated for by renewable energies (for example,
boiler replacement plus solar panels for hot water).189 As this threshold was widely
assessed as insufficient in view of the interim target for the building sector, the
Federal Parliament enacted a more stringent nationwide emissions limit for buildings
of 20 kilogrammes (kg) of CO2 per year and square metre of building space as of
2023, declining by 5 kg every five years, effectively banning new oil-fired heating sys-
tems altogether.190 From 2023 onwards, new buildings are generally not allowed to
emit any CO2 from fossil fuels through their heating and water heating systems.
191
5.4. Concluding Analysis: Close Interaction between the Layers of Federalism
to Avoid Federal Stalemate
Cooperation between the cantons to draft guidelines and model laws has turned out
to be the option preferred by the cantons to meet the challenges of scarce administra-
tive capacity associated with small-scale federalism, while guarding against central-
ization.192 Such ‘horizontal cooperative federalism’ provides limited incentives for
ambitious policies to mitigate climate change.193 On account of the intertwining of
powers and responsibilities regarding energy consumption in buildings, guidelines
drafted by the institutions of horizontal cooperative federalism that are manifestly
inadequate in view of the interim targets for the building sector defined in the
Federal CO2 Ordinance risk falling prey to federal pre-emption.
194 In general, mem-
bers of a federation involved in intertwined decision making might easily lose their
collective capacity to reach optimal decisions (because of the unanimity requirement)
and, moreover, may prove to be incapable of overcoming the institutional restrictions
of policy entanglement through reform.195 The closely interwoven powers of the
Federation and the cantons with regard to energy consumption in buildings suggest
that such a federal stalemate196 is avoidable as long as one actor – in the Swiss
case, the Federation – is constitutionally entitled ultimately to break the deadlock.
The Federal Constitution, the Federal CO2 Act, and the Federal EPA all confer this
188 See nn. 88 and 93 above.
189 See MoPEC 2014, n. 175 above, Art. 1.29–1.31.
190 See Federal CO2 Act (revised), n. 88 above, Art. 10(1)(a).
191 Ibid., Art. 10(1)(b).
192 See Section 5.2 above.
193 See Section 5.2 above.
194 See Section 5.3 above.
195 See F.W. Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons fromGerman Federalism and European Integration’
(1988) 66(3) Public Administration, pp. 239–78, at 241–2, 267–8, 271.
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option on the Federation for the regulation of energy consumption in buildings.197
The Federal Parliament, however, can be expected to exercise restraint, given not
only the respective constitutional obligation but the right of the cantons to put
such a federal statutory law to a popular vote by launching an optional
referendum.198
Against this backdrop, the main finding of the analysis of the interaction between the
cantons and the Federation with regard to the building sector might be that administra-
tive interlocking, in contrast to dualist federalism, provides the constituent units with
an influential position in a wide array of policy matters, regardless of whether there
exists a federal power in respect of specific policies. In order to countervail the asso-
ciated potential for suboptimal decisions or obstruction in institutions of horizontal
cooperative federalism owing to the unanimity requirement, constitutional flexibility
regarding the procedures of federalism proves to be crucial. The Swiss Federal
Constitution thus grants the Federation the option to retain the implementation of its
own laws for the Federal Administration based on statutory law.199 On this basis,
most climate change law is implemented by the Federal Administration, most notably
by the FOEN, rather than by the cantons.200
6.  
   
6.1. Policy Innovation in Climate Change Law
Federalism is routinely credited with promoting regulatory innovation.201
Switzerland’s small-scale federalism, however, ostensibly offers limited incentives
for policy innovation in climate change law. This is mainly a result of the broad
federal powers in environmental and energy policy, scarce administrative resources
and the limited expertise of many small cantons, and because the decision-making
processes within institutions of horizontal federalism are prone to dampening ambi-
tious environmental policies.202 As explained in more detail below, as a result of both
the specific structure of the Swiss electricity industry203 and the considerable admin-
istrative capacity of urban municipalities, the latter are better positioned than cantons
to act as regulatory laboratories for climate change mitigation policies within Swiss
federalism.204
197 See Sections 3.2 and 5.2., incl. n. 186, above.
198 See Sections 5.3 and 2.2 (‘Participation of the cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation’)
above, incl. n. 53.
199 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 46(1); see Section 2.2 (‘Administrative interlocking’) above,
incl. n. 44.
200 See Section 3.3 above.
201 See Sections 4.3 and 4.4 above.
202 See Section 5.4 above.
203 See Section 6.2 below.
204 See Section 6.3 below.
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6.2. The Swiss Electricity Industry: State Capitalism Embedded in a Market Economy
General government expenditure is an indicator of the size of government.205
Switzerland’s government spending amounts to 34.2% of its gross domestic prod-
uct.206 Apart from Lithuania and Ireland, this constitutes the lowest rate among the
European members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and it is considerably below the corresponding figures for the
US (38%), the United Kingdom (41%), and Austria (49.2%).207 In the light of this,
Switzerland appears to be an archetype of a free-market economy. The country’s elec-
tricity industry, however, is a far cry from this archetype. As a result of aggressive public
investment instigated in the second half of the 19th century,208 the sector resembles a
particular form of state capitalism. As little as 8.1% of the industry’s nominal capital
lies in private hands, while the lion’s share is held by cantons (61.7%) and municipal-
ities (26.6%).209 Liberalization of the sector since the 1990s ‘in the shadow of
EU-regulation’210 has remained half-hearted. Whereas electricity utility companies
are under an obligation to ensure the independence of network operation (‘unbund-
ling’), only end users with a consumption of more than 100 megawatt hours (Mwh)
per year – which is around 1% – are currently entitled to choose their electricity
supplier.211
6.3. Urban Municipalities: Bundling Policy Formulation, Policy Implementation,
and Administrative Capacities
The right to decide: aligning policies with citizens’ preferences by direct democracy
A particular interplay of factors – state capitalism in the electricity industry,212 the
extensive autonomy of Swiss municipalities,213 considerable administrative capacity
of urban municipalities, and the bundling of policy formulation (‘right to decide’)
and policy implementation (‘right to act’)214 in individual political authorities (namely,
205 See, e.g., P.A. Samuelson & W.A. Nordhaus, Economics, 19th edn (McGraw-Hill, 2009), p. 304.
206 OECD, Government at a Glance 2019 (OECD, 2019), p. 71, available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/
8ccf5c38-en.
207 Ibid.
208 See Section 3.4 above.
209 Swiss Federal Office of Energy, n. 78 above, p. 43 (the remaining 1% is indirectly held by the Federation,
2.6% by foreign investors).
210 M. Jegen, ‘Swiss Energy Policy and the Challenge of European Governance’ (2009) 15(4) Swiss Political
Science Review, pp. 577–602, at 580.
211 Federal Act on Electricity Supply, 23 Mar. 2007, No. 734.7, Arts 10, 6(1) and (6), and 13; official titles:
Bundesgesetz über die Stromversorgung’ (German), Loi sur l’approvisionnement en électricité (French),
Legge sull’approvvigionamento elettrico (Italian), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-
compilation/20042411/index.html. The Federal Council announced in spring 2020 that it will draft legis-
lation to further liberalize the market for electricity; see Swiss Federal Council, ‘Le Conseil fédéral entend
renforcer les énergies renouvelables indigènes et ouvrir le marché de l’électricité’, 3 Apr. 2020, available
at: https://www.uvek.admin.ch/uvek/fr/home/detec/medias/communiques-de-presse.msg-id-78665.html.
212 See Section 6.2 above.
213 See Section 2.2 ( ‘Administrative interlocking’) above.
214 On the distinction see Section 3.2 above, including n. 45.
Transnational Environmental Law24
https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102521000121
13 May 2021 at 15:47:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich  (Bill To for 21002 Zurich Uni), on
each municipality) – allows for considerable innovation in environmental and energy
policies at the level of local government. As part of their communal autonomy,
urban municipalities such as Zurich, Geneva, Basel, and Berne formulate their own
energy and environmental policies to the extent that they are in line with federal
law.215 Urban municipalities can largely rely on their state-owned enterprises to imple-
ment their energy and environmental strategies. The policies are usually closely aligned
with the preferences of a majority of their citizens on account of direct democracy, as
the example of the Municipality (City) of Zurich illustrates. Even in urban municipal-
ities with local parliaments, a small fraction of no more than 3% of all citizens has the
right to trigger a referendum against an act decided by the municipal parliament.216
Three thousand citizens of the City of Zurich may launch a popular initiative to be
decided at the ballot box.217 A referendum is mandatory in respect of amendments
to the municipal constitution.218 The City of Zurich’s constitutional commitment ‘to
achieve the goals of the 2,000-watt society, in particular a reduction in energy con-
sumption to 2,000 watts of continuous output per inhabitant’219 is therefore backed
by a referendum. The same is true for the City’s obligations to reduce its ‘CO2 emissions
to one tonne per inhabitant and year’.220
The right to act: state-owned enterprises implementing municipal policies
EWZ, the City of Zurich’s own electricity utility221 founded in 1892, supplies all pri-
vate households and most commercial premises in Zurich with electricity. It not only
owns and operates more than a dozen hydroelectric power stations in Switzerland
but is a direct or indirect shareholder in wind, solar, and nuclear power plants in
Switzerland, Northern Europe, Spain, and France.222 In terms of administrative law,
EWZ is, despite its economic activities, an agency of the municipal administration.223
EWZ is thus under an obligation to implement the environmental and energy strategies
and policies enacted by the City’s legislative and executive branches, in particular the
215 On federal pre-emption see Section 5.3 above.
216 Act on the Political Rights (Canton of Zurich), 1 Sept. 2003, No. 161, § 157(4); official title: Gesetz über
die politischen Rechte, available at: https://www.zh.ch/de/politik-staat/gesetze-beschluesse/gesetzes-
sammlung/zhlex-ls/erlass-161-2003_09_01-2005_01_01-108.html.
217 Ibid., § 157; Municipal Constitution of the City of Zurich, 26 Apr. 1970 (as at 26 Nov. 2017),
No. 101.100, Art. 15(3); official title: Gemeindeordnung der Stadt Zürich, available at:
https://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/portal/de/index/politik_u_recht/amtliche_sammlung/inhaltsverzeichnis/1/101/
Gemeinde ordnung_der_Stadt_Zuerich.html.
218 Municipal Constitution of the City of Zurich, ibid., Art. 10(a).
219 Ibid., Art. 2ter(2)(a).
220 Ibid., Art. 2ter(2)(b).
221 Elektrizitätswerk der Stadt Zürich (EWZ); see Decision of the Zurich City Council on the Structure and
Tasks of the Administration, 26 Mar. 1997 (as at 11 Sept. 2019), No. 172.110, Art. 52; official title:
Stadtratsbeschluss über die Departementsgliederung und -aufgaben (German), available at:
https://www.stadt-zuerich.ch/portal/de/index/politik_u_recht/amtliche_sammlung/inhaltsverzeichnis/1/
172/110.html.
222 See EWZ, Geschäfts- und Nachhaltigkeitsbericht 2018, June 2019, pp. 11, 28–30, 65, available at:
https://www.ewz.ch/content/dam/ewz/GNB/geschaeftsberichte/ewz_GNB_2018.pdf.
223 See Decision of the Zurich City Council, n. 221 above, Art. 52.
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aforementioned ‘goals of the 2000-watt society’.224 As a result, EWZ, among other
responsibilities, is under an obligation to supply electricity exclusively from renewable
sources, to advise its customers on measures to use electricity more efficiently, and to
support private investment in photovoltaic systems or appliances using electricity par-
ticularly economically with subsidies.225 Swiss federalism therefore allows for policy
innovation and experimentation at the local level and enables the direct implementation
of such policies through local state-owned enterprises.
6.4. ‘Alpine OPEC’: Diverging Interests of Mountainous Regions
The wide degree of autonomy that federalism entails for cantons and municipalities
with regard to energy policy may be harnessed in various and sometimes conflicting
ways, potentially undermining climate change mitigation policies of other, subnational
actors. A levy charged on the use of water resources highlights this feature of federalism.
Managing water resources is a power of the cantons.226 The cantons are therefore
entitled to levy fees on the use of water by hydroelectric power stations,227 the source
of more than half of the electricity produced in Switzerland.228 Five of the 26 cantons,
all located in the Alpine regions of Switzerland, levy 73.2% of all such fees.229 The
charges represent between 13 and 23% of all fiscal income of these Alpine cantons230
but amount to about one fifth of the production costs of electricity from hydro-
power.231 In 1981, some of the cantons that rely considerably on these fees on the
use of water for budgeting reasons, established their own forum of horizontal coopera-
tive federalism – the Government Conference of Alpine Cantons (RKGK).232 Because
the RKGK represents the interests of its members in connection with natural resources
rather robustly, it is sometimes ironically dubbed the ‘Alpine OPEC’ in allusion to the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).233The vigorous represen-
tation of interests by cantons in the RKGK, in striving to raise the levy charged on the
use of water, sheds light on the divergent interests at the subnational level: whereas the
224 See Ordinance on Public Services of EWZwithin the Framework of the 2000-Watt Targets, 2 Dec. 2015,
No. 732.360; official title: Verordnung über gemeinwirtschaftliche Leistungen des Elektriziätswerks der
Stadt Zürich (ewz) im Rahmen der 2000-Watt-Ziele (German), available at: https://www.stadt-zuerich.
ch/portal/de/index/politik_u_recht/amtliche_sammlung/inhaltsverzeichnis/7/732/360-verordnung-ueber-
gemeinwirtschaftliche-leistungen-des-elektr.html.
225 Ibid., Arts 1(2)(b), 4 and 6(1)(a) and (b).
226 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 76(4) 1st sentence.
227 Ibid., Art. 76(4) 2nd sentence.
228 See Section 3.1 above.
229 Swiss Federal Council, ‘Message sur la modification de la loi sur les forces hydrauliques’ (2018) Federal
Gazette 2018, pp. 3539–60, at 3543, available at: https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/droit-federal/
feuille-federale.html.
230 Ibid., p. 3542.
231 Ibid., p. 3549.
232 ‘Regierungskonferenz der Gebirgskantone RKGK’, available at: http://www.rkgk.ch. The English termin-
ology is derived from Vatter, n. 32 above, p. 76.
233 See, e.g., H. Stalder, ‘Bundesrat kapituliert vor der Alpen-Opec’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 25 May
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sparsely populated cantons of the Alpine regions largely favour a high levy on water
used for electricity production, the urban and densely populated cantons and munici-
palities of the lowlands, such as the City of Zurich, tend to prefer lower rates in order to
promote electricity from renewable sources. These urban cantons are also often those
reaping the fiscal benefits of trade in electricity, as this trade is administered mostly
through premises in urban regions of Switzerland while production predominately
takes place in the mountains.234 As with other aspects of Swiss federalism,235 federal
law entrusts the federal government with the task of avoiding a possible stalemate
amidst conflicting interests: it is the Federal Parliament that determines the rate ceiling
of fees on the use of water.236 To avoid distorting competition, the cantons are prohib-
ited from levying lower charges on electricity being not only produced but used on their
territory.237
6.5. Concluding Analysis: Experimentalism, Dissonance, and Resolution
Economic approaches to federalism routinely credit federalism with enhancing the
potential for policy innovation.238 Such theories often tend to refer to concepts of ‘dual-
istic federalism’239 in which the spheres of the Federation and the constituent states are,
by and large, clearly separated.240Administrative interlocking, in contrast, presupposes
both cooperation and burden sharing (transfer payments), and allows for the participa-
tion of the constituent units in the decision-making process of the Federation.241 As
opposed to constitutional frameworks of dualistic federalism, the three layers of
Swiss federalism are thus not neatly separated but closely intertwined. Energy policies
of urban municipalities such as the City of Zurich attest that such close intertwining
across the layers of federalism still provides room for policy experimentation in line
with the preferences of the local citizens.242 Owing to both small-scale federalism
and its political and legal intertwinement, different preferences regarding energy and
environmental policies within the various subnational entities may interfere with
each other and thus create dissonance. The levy charged on the use of water illustrates
this phenomenon.243On the one hand, the levy significantly raises the production costs
234 See Swiss Federal Court, n. 44 above, Decision 2C_495/2017, 27May 2019 (declaring unlawful the tax-
ation of the profits from trade in electricity at the premises of the plant).
235 See Section 5.4 above.
236 See Federal Act on the Utilization of Hydropower, 22 Dec. 1916, No. 721.80, Art. 49(1); official titles:
Bundesgesetz über die Nutzbarmachung der Wasserkräfte (German), Loi fédérale sur l’utilisation des
forces hydrauliques (French), Legge federale sull’utilizzazione delle forze idriche (Italian), available at:
https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19160015/index.html.
237 Ibid., Art. 49(3).
238 See Sections 4.1 and 4.3 above.
239 See Section 2.2 above.
240 See Sections 4.1 and 4.3 above.
241 See Section 2.2 (‘Participation of the cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation’ and
‘Taxing powers and fiscal autonomy) above; Linder & Mueller, n. 46 above, pp. 174, 210–2; Vatter,
n. 32 above, pp. 27, 187.
242 See Section 6.3 above.
243 See Section 6.4 above.
Johannes Reich 27
https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102521000121
13 May 2021 at 15:47:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich  (Bill To for 21002 Zurich Uni), on
of electricity from hydropower and thus undermines the energy policies of entities like
the City of Zurich, which is committed to supplying its customers with electricity pro-
duced exclusively from renewable sources. Higher production costs as a result of levies
entail the risk that lower-priced electricity produced from coal will be imported more
often, while electricity from hydropower may be crowded out of the market.244 On
the other hand, the levy on the use of water reflects the cantons’ right to dispose of
their own resources, and also demonstrates that the resource ‘water’ tends to become
more valuable in the light of both the transition to more sustainable energy production
and climate change. To the extent that such conflicting interests require an authoritative
resolution, federal law again provides a way out of possible federal stalemate by grant-
ing the Federal Parliament the power to determine the rate ceiling of the levy charged on
the use of water.245
The diverging priorities within the various subnational entities may thus interfere
with each other and create dissonance. Against the backdrop of broad federal powers,
it is ultimately for the Federation to determinewhich energy and environmental policies
are given preference based on the experience of the different subnational units, should
the conflict between the different regulatory approaches call for a resolution.246 As a
consequence of the right of eight cantons to launch an optional referendum against
any such federal statutory law, however, any decision by the Federation on the direction
of energy and environmental policy constitutes the result of a prolonged procedure,
which includes close consultation and bargaining between the Federation and the
cantons.247
7. : , ,
,     
Federalism is ostensibly misplaced to mitigate climate change as a global public good,
as it may project the inadequate incentive structures existing at the international level
onto the domestic domain.248 Yet both the architecture and the procedures of
Switzerland’s climate change law suggest that such concerns generally fail to material-
ize. Unlike dualistic federations such as the US, Swiss federalism is based on adminis-
trative interlocking leading to cooperation and bargaining across the different layers
of federalism.249 The constitutional principles of Swiss federalism250 on implementing
federal laws provide not only for flexibility but also allow the Federation to act on its
244 The validity of this argument depends largely on (i) market prices for electricity in western Europe, and
(ii) the degree to which the Swiss market for electricity is and will be liberalized; on the latter see
Section 6.2 above and Swiss Federal Council, n. 211 above.
245 See Section 6.4 above.
246 Ibid.
247 See Section 2.2 (‘Participation of the cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation’) above.
248 See Section 1 above.
249 See Sections 2.1, 2.2 (‘Administrative interlocking’ and ‘Participation of the cantons in the decision-mak-
ing process of the Federation’), 3.3, 5.1 and 6.5 above.
250 See Sections 2.2 and 4.4 above.
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own in order to overcome potential stalemate. The Federation is entitled to depart from
the constitutional rule according to which it is for the cantons to implement federal law
on the basis of a provision of federal statutory law.251 As a result, it is the FOEN rather
than the cantons that is entrusted with the implementation of almost all parts of the
comprehensive Federal CO2 Act, the centrepiece of domestic climate change law.
252
Even in areas of domestic climate change law for which the cantons are primarily
responsible, such as energy consumption in buildings,253 the Federationmay ultimately
enact federal regulations that override the laws of the cantons.254 The formally unilat-
eral right of the Federation to decide255 is likely not only to provide institutions of hori-
zontal cooperative federalism with incentives to adopt more stringent regulations but
also to avoid federal impasse.256 The Federation’s right to decide, however, is severely
restrained by the right of eight cantons or 50,000 citizens to launch a referendum
against any federal statutory law decided by the Federal Parliament. Any decision by
the Federation on the direction of energy and environmental policy therefore constitu-
tes the result of a prolonged procedure, which includes close consultation between the
Federation and the cantons.257
The main lessons from the Swiss experience regarding the relationship between laws
designed to mitigate climate change and federalism therefore might be that small-scale
federalism neither unavoidably weakens environmental standards nor necessarily leads
to federal stalemate. This is on the condition that the legal architecture of domestic cli-
mate change law provides for considerable federal powers, a degree of institutional
flexibility, robust formal channels of influence for subnational actors on policy formu-
lation at the federal level, ample room for regulatory experimentalism at the lower
layers of federalism, and the right to act conferred on the Federation to avoid political
impasse among the constituent units.
251 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 27 above, Art. 46(1); see Section 2.2 (‘Administrative interlocking’), incl.
n. 44, above.
252 See Section 3.3 above.
253 See Section 3.2 above, incl. nn. 85–87.
254 See Section 5.3 above.
255 See Section 2.2 (‘Administrative interlocking’) above.
256 See Sections 5.1–5.4 above.
257 See Section 2.2 (‘Participation of the cantons in the decision-making process of the Federation’) above.
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